Campers,
Following on in my research.
This section I’m lifting again from Wikipedia where I became a big buck revolving donator a few months ago at Two dollars per and you should do the same.
There’s an article in Colliers about this time on same topic …\y. O’Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on December 12, 2005, following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[10]
Security and concealment issues[edit]
For more information on the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines
In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems’ proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to Wired (magazine).[11] [12][13][14][15]
In 2004, Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[16][17] Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."[18]
In January 2004, RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Maryland, did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[19][20]
In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[21]
In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[22] on page 2 the California report states that:
"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti’s attack does work: Mr. Hursti’s attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."y. O’Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on December 12, 2005, following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[10]
Security and concealment issues[edit]
For more information on the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines
In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems’ proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to Wired (magazine).[11] [12][13][14][15]
In 2004, Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[16][17] Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."[18]
In January 2004, RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Maryland, did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[19][20]
In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[21]
In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[22] on page 2 the California report states that:
"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti’s attack does work: Mr. Hursti’s attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."y. O’Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on December 12, 2005, following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[10]
Security and concealment issues[edit]
For more information on the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines
In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems’ proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to Wired (magazine).[11] [12][13][14][15]
In 2004, Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[16][17] Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."[18]
In January 2004, RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Maryland, did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[19][20]
In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[21]
In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[22] on page 2 the California report states that:
"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti’s attack does work: Mr. Hursti’s attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."y. O’Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on December 12, 2005, following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[10]
Security and concealment issues[edit]
For more information on the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines
In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems’ proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to Wired (magazine).[11] [12][13][14][15]
In 2004, Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[16][17] Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."[18]
In January 2004, RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Maryland, did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[19][20]
In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[21]
In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[22] on page 2 the California report states that:
"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti’s attack does work: Mr. Hursti’s attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."y. O’Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on December 12, 2005, following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[10]
Security and concealment issues[edit]
For more information on the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines
In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems’ proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to Wired (magazine).[11] [12][13][14][15]
In 2004, Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[16][17] Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."[18]
In January 2004, RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Maryland, did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[19][20]
In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[21]
In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[22] on page 2 the California report states that:
"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti’s attack does work: Mr. Hursti’s attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."y. O’Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on December 12, 2005, following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[10]
Security and concealment issues[edit]
For more information on the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines
In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems’ proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to Wired (magazine).[11] [12][13][14][15]
In 2004, Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[16][17] Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."[18]
In January 2004, RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Maryland, did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[19][20]
In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[21]
In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[22] on page 2 the California report states that:
"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti’s attack does work: Mr. Hursti’s attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."y. O’Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on December 12, 2005, following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[10]
Security and concealment issues[edit]
For more information on the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines
In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems’ proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to Wired (magazine).[11] [12][13][14][15]
In 2004, Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[16][17] Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."[18]
In January 2004, RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Maryland, did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[19][20]
In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[21]
In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[22] on page 2 the California report states that:
"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti’s attack does work: Mr. Hursti’s attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."y. O’Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on December 12, 2005, following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[10]
Security and concealment issues[edit]
For more information on the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines
In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems’ proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to Wired (magazine).[11] [12][13][14][15]
In 2004, Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[16][17] Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."[18]
In January 2004, RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Maryland, did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[19][20]
In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[21]
In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[22] on page 2 the California report states that:
"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti’s attack does work: Mr. Hursti’s attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."y. O’Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on December 12, 2005, following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[10]
Security and concealment issues[edit]
For more information on the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines
In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems’ proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to Wired (magazine).[11] [12][13][14][15]
In 2004, Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[16][17] Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."[18]
In January 2004, RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Maryland, did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[19][20]
In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[21]
In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[22] on page 2 the California report states that:
"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti’s attack does work: Mr. Hursti’s attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."y. O’Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on December 12, 2005, following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[10]
Security and concealment issues[edit]
For more information on the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines
In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems’ proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to Wired (magazine).[11] [12][13][14][15]
In 2004, Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[16][17] Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."[18]
In January 2004, RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Maryland, did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[19][20]
In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[21]
In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[22] on page 2 the California report states that:
"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti’s attack does work: Mr. Hursti’s attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."
h. brown's SF Bulldog 
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